THE SECOND ARAB AWAKENING by Norton, Augustus Richard
5After years of false promises and thwarted hopes significant 
political reform is no longer a hypothetical possibility but a 
reality. In the annals of the Middle East, the year 2011 is likely 
to be remembered for quite some time to come. As the year 
began protests were accelerating in Tunisia, and on January 
14 President Zine al-Abidine Ben ‘Ali fled into exile in Saudi 
Arabia. In neighboring Egypt the Tunisians’ accomplishment 
lent momentum to widespread demonstrations especially after 
January 25, 2011, designated (following Tunisia’s example) as 
the “Day of Rage” (yaum al-ghadab). Eighteen days later, after 
more than 800 demonstrators were killed by security forces and 
government-linked thugs, President Husni Mubarak, who had 
ruled Egypt for three decades, resigned from office, thereby 
launching a process of political and constitutional transition 
that is likely to continue for years. Across the Arab world, 
emulative protests spread in nearly every country, with varying 
success and sometimes with horrendous bloodshed. In Libya, a 
strongman met his demise; in Yemen, a dictator retreated from 
the presidency; in Bahrain, protesters demanding reform and 
equitable treatment, were suppressed within weeks by a Saudi-
led force that was intended to stymie demands for reform; and, 
in Syria, chants of “irhal, irhal” (go/scram) were met by brutal 
government violence and a descent into a civil war that by late 
2012 claimed at least 18,000 lives. (Case studies illustrating 
the widely variant outcomes of popular demands for reform in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria appear below). 
In western circles, the burgeoning protests, which typically 
included the trademark demand “al-sha’ab yurid isqat al-
nizam” (the people want the fall of the regime), were styled 
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an “Arab Spring”, but the seasonal metaphor 
fails to capture the profound underpinnings 
of the protests as well as the magnitude of 
the challenges that still lay ahead. In Arab 
discourse 2011 has been described by many 
people as “al-sahwah” (the awakening), or 
“the second Arab renaissance” (al-nahdah al-
thaniyah), or even “al-thawrat al-‘arabia” (the 
Arab rebellions). All of these characterizations 
are apt. 
Perhaps the keystone of the transformation 
that is underway is the clamor for respect and 
dignity (karāmah), arguably the core demand 
of the protests. All too often, Arab governments 
have treated their subjects and citizens with 
disdain, sloughing off their legitimate demands 
. Whether monarchy or Arab republic, 
authoritarianism in the Arab world has been 
characterized by the depoliticization of public 
space. Other than 
political humor, politics 
in many corners of the 
Arab world has been 
consigned to private, 
and even then only 
broached cautiously 
with trusted intimates. 
The depolitization of 
public space persists 
in places like Saudi 
Arabia, where a hint of dissent provokes an 
iron fist response (as well as prophylactic 
cascades of money; in 2011, $35 billion in new 
funding and subsidies to address domestic 
concerns was announced). In many instances 
however, the citizenry of the Arab world 
is evincing degrees of empowerment and 
political sensitivity that have not been seen 
for generations (one recollects the post-Suez 
period). Challand succinctly refers to a new 
sense of collective autonomy, tasayir dhati, in 
Arab societies.(Challand 2011)(2).
Muslims and the Question of Political 
Reform 
There are now over 1.6 billion Muslims in 
the world, including 450 million in the Middle 
East, and more than 300 million in the Arab 
world alone. While it would be convenient if a 
preponderance of Muslims embraced western 
secular ideals, not to mention western-style 
democracy, but the picture is more complex. A 
relative handful of Arab liberals do share and 
espouse western ideals, but they do not have a 
broad constituency. The dominant oppositional 
forces in the broader Muslim world—not least 
in the Arab world—have typically been hostile 
to secularism, particularly when secularism 
is understood to mean that Islamic values 
have no place in 
politics, but they also 
embrace representative 
democracy. In a region 
in which religion is an 
important source of 
personal identity, any 
opening of the political 
system brings with it 
a debate about the 
proper role of religion in 
society and the relationship of religion to the 
state, but Middle Eastern governments have 
generally not been willing to experiment in 
political reform and allow that debate to occur. 
There are many variants of democracy, but 
a core component is the conduct of reasonably 
fair competitive elections. In many of the 
countries of the region open elections would 
either bring Islamist parties to power or, at a 
minimum, provide them a substantial voice 
Perhaps the keystone of the 
transformation that is underway is 
the clamor for respect and dignity 
(karāmah), arguably the core demand 
of the protests
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in politics. This prospect generated unease 
in western circles. At best, major external 
powers, such as the United States, promoted 
a go-slow approach, but more typically sought 
to undermine elections that brought Islamists 
to power. The cases of Algeria and Palestine 
are instructive. 
Algeria 
In the face of horrible unemployment, 
discontent and economic failure, Algeria 
attempted democratization in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The ruling National Liberation 
Front (FLN) had monopolized power for three 
decades, ever since Algeria won its hard fought 
independence from France in 1962. The FLN 
was soundly trounced by the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) in Algeria’s first free elections, 
including municipal and then parliamentary 
elections. The Algerian army intervened in 
January 1992 to prevent the FIS from realizing 
its victory and civil war ensued. It is impossible 
to know whether the FIS might have ruled 
competently or incompetently and whether it 
would have been able to impose its religious 
values on a divided society split between 
secularism and religious conservatism. 
More than 100,000 people died in the 
internal war and Algeria became a cautionary 
tale invoked routinely by Middle East dictators, 
secularly inclined intellectuals and western 
officials alike. The failure of the Algerian reform 
experiment certainly illustrated the likely fate 
of ruling parties when exposed to reasonably 
free elections. 
Algerian secularists who enthusiastically 
supported the coup in 1992 now often concede 
that it would have been far better to permit the 
FIS experiment to go forward, especially since 
the option of intervention on the Turkish model 
would have continued to be an option for the 
Algerian generals. 
Less noticed is that the debacle in Algeria 
also prompted a lot of soul-searching amongst 
Islamist thinkers concerning whether and how 
they should accommodate themselves to the 
prevailing autocratic regimes. Some leading 
thinkers, such as the late Lebanese cleric, 
Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din argued 
that FIS erred in seeking power and did not 
take into account the strong secular impulse 
in Algerian society. Others urged a path of 
peaceful political accommodation and playing 
within the rules of the existing game. 
Hamas and the 2006 elections 
When Palestinian legislative elections 
were conducted in January 2006, at U.S. 
insistence, the unexpected but clearcut 
winner was Hamas, the Islamist group (Lesch 
2007). Palestinian voters were expressing 
their anger at Israel’s occupation and the 
burgeoning of illegal settlements on occupied 
There are many variants of 
democracy, but a core component 
is the conduct of reasonably fair 
competitive elections. In many of 
the countries of the region open 
elections would either bring Islamist 
parties to power or, at a minimum, 
provide them a substantial voice in 
politics. This prospect generated 
unease in western circles
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Palestinian territory, as well as the notorious 
corruption of the Palestinian Authority and 
Fatah. Contrary to the sanguine acceptance 
of the wholly unexpected result, the U.S. led 
a campaign to isolate the new Gaza-based 
Hamas government and starve it of funds, 
which also entails starving large numbers 
of aid-dependent Palestinians. European 
diplomats and some U.S. officials urged a 
path of incremental inclusion instead, but the 
U.S. rejected any attempt to co-opt Hamas 
so long as refused to foreswear terrorism or 
accept Israel’s legitimacy. The policy was not 
successful. Hamas seized complete control 
of Gaza in 2007, and a rival Fatah-oriented 
government resides in the still Israeli-occupied 
West Bank. Despite a series of Israeli raids and 
bombardments that have killed many civilians, 
including military campaign in December 2008 
and January 2009, and notwithstanding the 
impoverishment of Gaza, Hamas continues 
in power and still enjoys significant popular 
support. Arguably, the path of incremental 
inclusion (as respected international diplomats 
urged) rather than exclusion would have been 
a wiser response to the Hamas electoral 
triumph. Hamas is indisputably an entrenched 
player in Palestinian politics. 
It is indisputable that the U.S.-led campaign 
to overturn the 2006 Palestinian election, 
as well as the West’s tolerance for Algeria’s 
repressive government bred deep cynicism 
in the Muslim world about western avowals of 
democracy and freedom. 
The Spark that Ignited Revolt 
Given the at best tepid external support 
for substantial political reform, particularly 
entailing the inclusion of Islamist opposition 
groups, and considering the hostility of Arab 
governments to credible political reform, the 
puzzle is under what circumstances the ruling 
structures would be compelled to succumb 
to popular demands for change? For years, 
public space in Arab countries has been 
depoliticized so that even ephemeral attempts 
to organize or mobilize opposition were met 
with repression and intimidation. The solution 
to the puzzle finally came in Tunisia when fruit 
seller Mohammed Bouazizi set himself alight 
in a desperate quest for dignity in the city of 
Sidi Bouzid, on December 17, 2010. 
One should note discount the demonstration 
effects of either the “Green Revolution” in Iran 
during 2009 when mulititudes of Iranians took 
to urban streets to protest what was seen 
as a crooked presidential election, or the 
toppling of the Ba’thist regime in Iraq by the 
Anglo-American invasion of 2003. The Green 
Revolution, though thwarted and ultimately 
suppressed demonstrated the great potential 
of people power and the importance of social 
media on the Internet and through ubiquitous 
cell-phones. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, while accomplished by foreign armies, 
underlined that even the Arab world’s most-
feared dictators were vulnerable. 
Arguably, the path of incremental 
inclusion (as respected international 
diplomats urged) rather than 
exclusion would have been a wiser 
response to the Hamas electoral 
triumph
Augustus Richard Norton: The Second Arab Awakening
9KUFA REVIEW: No.1 - Issue 1 - Fall 2012
Tunisia: The Jasmine Revolution 
Of all the North African countries, Tunisia 
would seem to enjoy the best chance for a 
democratic transformation. The population of 
11 million is generally well-educated and there 
is a sizable middle class, and an impressive 
civil society. Tunisia has also been a pioneer 
in its commitment to women’s rights, which 
are arguably more respected in Tunisia 
than in any of the North African countries. 
The small Tunisian military, which includes 
less than 40,000 people under arms, is led 
by a professional official corps that has not 
infiltrated the civilian economy in the same 
way that the behemoth Egyptian military has 
done.
North Africa, “the Maghrib” (the West), 
is a region of remarkable cultural and 
political diversity. While the population is 
predominantly Arab, there are also important 
ethnic minorities, especially the Berbers who 
comprise important and often restive minorities 
in Algeria and Morocco (with sizable numbers 
as well as in Tunisia and Libya). While this may 
change, within Tunisia, the Arab-Berber divide 
has been far less important than it is in either 
Morocco or Algeria, where the Berbers have 
insisted on education in the Berber language, 
as well as cultural autonomy. 
Tunisia’s Islamists are led by Rachid 
Ghannouchi, who is often celebrated as 
a moderate figure. He only returned from 
exile in February 2011 after years of living in 
London where he played an important role as 
a voice for Muslim accommodation in Europe. 
The Renaissance Party (al-Nahdah), which 
Ghannouchi founded, managed to survive 
years of state suppression by maintaining a 
covert presence in society and cultivating a 
youthful leadership. Tunisia is also known for 
its strong labor union movement, one that is 
without parallel in North Africa, or the Arab 
world for that matter. 
Time and again since December 2010, 
Tunisians rallied to preserve the momentum 
of the Jasmine Revolution. The result is that 
many remnants of the oppressive Ben Ali 
regime have been expunged. 
Transparent and well-designed elections 
for seats in the proportionately distributed 217 
member National Constituent Assembly were 
held on October 23, 2011. The Assembly is 
charged with writing a new constitution. Thirty 
parties participated but six won three quarters 
of all seats. While al-Nahdah won the largest 
share with 90 seats, a variety of ideological 
and regional groups won representation, and 
19 seats were allocated to Tunisians living 
abroad. 
While the Secretary-General of al-Nahdah 
Hamadi Jebali became Prime Minister in 
December 2011, the Constituent Assembly 
named Moncef Marzouki, a highly respected 
human rights activist and physician, acting-
President (a weaker position than the 
premiership). 
As in Egypt, and across the Arab world, 
conservative Salafists have asserted 
themselves in Tunisia, often targeting secular 
institutions such as universities for failing to 
adhere to strict moral standards, including 
permitting men and women to study together, 
or for not permitting veiled women to enter 
campus. While the Salafists are comparably 
weak in Tunisia, their activism is likely to 
foment clashes with Tunisian secularists, who 
in turn will challenge al-Nahdah to exemplify 
the pluralism that it was avowed. 
Arabs are watching developments in 
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Tunisia closely. The country is a bellwether 
for the fate of the Arab Awakening; including 
Egypt where the fall of Ben Ali helped inspire 
widescale demonstrations. 
Egypt: The January 25th Revolution 
Egyptians chafed under the Mubarak 
dictatorship for years. While opposition 
activities were often stymied by repression 
and dampened by fear, labor strikes were 
increasingly commonplace and political 
activists continued to highlight regime abuses. 
Within opposition Islamist circles there was 
much debate and discussion about themes of 
civil society, democracy and tolerance(3).
Using word of mouth, cell phone messaging, 
and social networking tools, especially 
Facebook, which had become a locus of 
opposition communication by the previous fall, 
January 25 was declared a “Day of Rage”. A 
variety of groups was involved, but for many 
the memory of Khalid Said, a young computer 
activist who was savagely beaten to death 
by police the previous summer in Alexandria 
was vivid (see http://www.elshaheeed.co.uk/). 
Tens of thousands turned out, especially 
in Cairo’s Tahrir (Liberation) Square, a 
central site adjacent to Egypt’s famous 
archeological museum, where chants of “irhal, 
irhal, irhal! (scram, get out, leave)” became 
commonplace. Although the momentum 
was tenuous, especially when armed thugs 
were unleashed by the government to foster 
a climate of lawlessness, the “revolution” 
succeeded in a mere 18 days to topple Husni 
Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt since 1981, 
when he notoriously pledged to serve only 
one six-year term. 
The old order has been shaken but it 
remains to be seen whether a revolution has 
occurred in Egypt. The massive Egyptian 
military holds the reins of power and it was the 
senior generals who told Mubarak that his time 
was up and pledged to superintend a transition 
to elections. Yet, the military has a big stake 
in the present distribution of resources and 
privileges and it begs credulity to imagine that 
the uniformed brass will accept any political 
arrangement that challenges their vested 
interests. This is a gargantuan constraint on 
reform. 
In March 2011, the Egyptians went to the 
polls and overwhelmingly approved (more 
than 77 percent voted “yes”) a series of 
constitutional amendments intended to permit 
parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Despite promises by the ruling Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that the 
new constitution would be drafted in an open 
process, the military unilaterally amended 
55 articles of the existing constitution after 
the referendum. The full dimensions of the 
generals’ agenda became clear on November 
1, 2011, when SCAF distributed its “Guidelines” 
for the drafting of a new Constitution. These 
guidelines include the following points: there 
would be no scrutiny of the military budget 
by civilian authorities and the military would 
retain veto power over any proffered drafts of 
a new constitution. 
Although there were about twenty legal 
parties in Mubarak’s time, few of them enjoyed 
anything approaching a national organization. 
Groups that credibly espouse the values of 
the Tahrir Square have to literally start from 
the ground up to create a political party. The 
only opposition group that can boast a national 
organization is the long outlawed Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has founded the Freedom 
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and Justice Party. A variety of other Islamist 
parties have emerged, including the Hizb al-
Wasat, the reformist Islamist “Center Party” 
that was finally granted legal status in 2011, 
after 16 years of struggle. 
The growing vitality of Salafist parties 
is noteworthy. The Salafists are generally 
contemptuous of profane politics, but have 
proved quite pragmatic in exploiting political 
opportunity in order to advance their goal of 
instilling a conservative Islamic order in Egypt. 
Salafi groups have long been especially active 
in Alexandria, but they also enjoy a national 
following. 
Parliamentary elections were concluded 
in December 2011, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party 
and allied parties won nearly half of the 508 
seats with the Salafists coming in second with 
a quarter of the seats. The secularly oriented 
groups that played such formative role in 
launching and sustaining the Tahrir Square 
demonstrations, came in a distant third with 
their votes scattered among an admixture of 
small parties. 
Presidential elections followed in June 
2012. Non-Islamist candidates for the 
presidency included former air force general 
and Prime Minister Ahmad Shafik, a long-
term Mubarak ally, Amre Moussa, the former 
Secretary-General of the Arab League and a 
former foreign minister, and leftist Hamdeen 
Sabahi. Non-Islamist voters split their 
votes between Sabahi and Moussa, 
so law and order man Shafik came 
in second and then entered a run-
off against Muhammad Mursi, the 
Brotherhood’s candidate. After days 
of suspense (and rampant suspicions 
that the results were being “cooked”), 
Mursi was declared the winner with about 52 
per cent of the vote. This was a watershed 
moment in Egypt’s political history. 
There is a complex competition for power 
and public support underway including the 
new president, SCAF, and a variety of state 
institutions, especially the judiciary and the 
Mubarak-era internal security apparatus. The 
Constitutional Court, in a ruling upheld by 
SCAF ordered new parliamentary elections, 
a ruling promptly challenged by the newly 
inaugurated President Mursi. Nonetheless, 
the new president proved his mettle in August 
2012 when he forced the senior SCAF figures, 
including Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, into 
retirement after serious security lapses in the 
Sinai. No doubt, political power in Egypt will 
be contested for years to come, and major 
external powers will wield influence as well, 
not least the United States, which gives the 
Egyptian military almost $2 billion a year in 
security assistance. 
Libya: The “Mukhtar Revolution”(4) 
Mu’ammar’s Qadhafi’s strategy of ruling 
was premised on weak state institutions and 
alliances with favored tribes. His self-styled 
jamahirriya—people’s republic—was intended 
to preclude challenges to his power by diffusing 
power throughout society. Hence, the Libyan 
Army was weak and fragmented, particularly 
the eastern units center around the city of 
The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, while 
accomplished by foreign armies, underlined 
that even the Arab world’s most-feared 
dictators were vulnerable
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Benghazi. The judiciary was fragmented, and 
the police forces lacked a central authority. As 
for civil society, any initiative that suggested 
establishing anything resembling autonomous 
local actors was suppressed or crushed by the 
state. This means that any group seizing the 
state must immediately confront the task of 
building national institutions, as well allowing 
impetus to civil society. 
In Libya, swelling protests began in mid-
February. On February 17, 2011, a proclaimed 
“Day of Rage” inspired by the models of 
Tunisia and Egypt prompted deadly response, 
especially against demonstrators in Tripoli’s 
Green Square. A vindictive Mu’amar Qadhafi 
promised to tolerate no dissent and declared 
that his opponents were drug-addled al-
Qaeda-led terrorists, and he called on Libyans 
to fight the “greasy rats”. 
As the groundswell of opposition to 
Qadhafi’s rule expanded in February and 
March, one could observe an inchoate 
civil society in formation, but Libya lacks 
either an established political opposition 
or established legal institutions other than 
tribal based traditions of customary law. The 
Muslim Brotherhood does enjoy considerable 
support, especially in the eastern cities, 
including Benghazi, and Salafist groups have 
been picking up wind in recent years. The 
venerable Sufi or mystical orders, especially 
the Sanusiyya, played an important role in 
Libyan history, including leading the anti-
colonial campaign against the Italians. The 
Sanusiyya were ruthlessly repressed by 
Qadhafi, but they are resurging. 
In an extraordinary meeting on March 
12, the Arab League voted to support 
international action to protect Libyan civilians, 
which was followed five days later by United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. 
The resolution enabled the U.S.-European 
intervention to create “no-drive” and “no-fly” 
zones to stop attacks on Libyan civilians. 
The NATO effort evolved into a transparent 
campaign to destroy the military apparatus of 
the Qadhafi regime in support of opposition 
forces that were literally engaged in a 
dangerous on-the-job training. 
Qadhafi’s capture on October 20, 2011, 
and his bloody ignominious end came amidst 
reports not only of government atrocities and 
mass executions, but scores of summary 
executions of regime loyalists by opposition 
militias. The legacy of disregard for legal 
processes and disrespect for fundamental 
human rights by both sides suggest that rocky 
days lie ahead in liberated Libya, where many 
militias resist disarming. 
The partners in power will include religious 
groups and the tribes, and inchoate political 
parties. The importance of tribal affiliations 
were clear in the national elections that were 
organized in June 2012. The victorious and 
relatively liberal National Alliance is led by 
Mahmoud Jibril, a US educated member 
of the large Warfalla tribe who served as 
Although the Shi’i Muslims account for 
nearly 70 percent of the small population 
(excluding expatriate workers, the 
Bahraini citizens number about 600,000), 
they have typically been on the short of 
the stick in terms of access to government 
employment and favors
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interim prime minister following the toppling 
of Qadhafi. Jibril’s victory was shortlived. A 
coalition of tribes and Islamists managed to 
wrest control of the parliament and sideline 
Jibril. 
After demonstratons erupted in Arab 
countries and across the ‘ummah against a 
hateful if amateurish anti-Islam film made in 
California and distributed by You Tube, the U.S. 
Ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed 
in Benghazi in September 2012. His killers, 
purportedly affiliated to al-Qaeda, launched 
an opportunistic but skillful assault on the U.S. 
consulate. Stevens was reportedly a popular 
diplomat in Libya, and his death prompted 
a strong reaction against some Islamist 
militias, but it remains to be seen if there will 
be a lasting impact on the centralization of 
competent security institutions in Libya. 
“The Syria Revolution”: 
Following the death in 2000 of Hafiz al-
Asad, who ruled Syria for twenty-seven years, 
there was hope that his son and successor Dr. 
Bashar al-Asad would shepherd Syria toward 
more freedom. Whatever Bashar’s intentions, 
he promptly revealed his dependence on 
the authoritarian structure of power that his 
wilely father had mastered. After a flush of 
excitement in 2000, opposition voices were 
soon stifled by the state. 
The chant that became famous in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya was “al-Sha’ab yurid isqat al-
nizam” [the people want the fall of the regime], 
but in Damascus the regime was smugly 
confident that Syria would not be affected 
by the upheaval. Not only were the many 
agencies of the security apparatus vigilant to 
control dissent but President Bashar al-Asad 
presented himself as a reformer. In 2011, 
he gave a long interview to the Wall Street 
Journal, in which he argued that Syria was 
stable: 
“We always say that we need reform but 
what kind of reform. This is first. Second, if 
you want to make a comparison between what 
is happening in Egypt and Syria, you have to 
look from a different point: why is Syria stable, 
although we have more difficult conditions? 
Egypt has been supported financially by the 
United States, while we are under embargo by 
most countries of the world. We have growth 
although we do not have many of the basic 
needs for the people. Despite all that, the 
people do not go into an uprising. So it is not 
only about the needs and not only about the 
reform. It is about the ideology, the beliefs and 
the cause that you have. There is a difference 
between having a cause and having a vacuum. 
So, as I said, we have many things in common 
but at the same time we have some different 
things(5). 
February passed with only a few small 
demonstrations, but by March it became 
clear that Syria was by no means immune 
as a surge of demonstrations began in 
the southern Houran district of Syria, 
particularly in the Sunni town of Deraa. The 
demonstrations were provoked by the arrest 
and heinous mistreatment of teenagers who 
had been nabbed by the police for posting 
anti-regime graffiti. The initial protests evoked 
a bloody response from the regime, but 
the demonstrations spread throughout the 
southern region, despite widespread arrests 
and indiscriminate killings by the army and 
police. As in Egypt, government thugs, known 
locally as “shabiha”, were commonly employed 
as well. By the end of March, President al-
Asad had sacked his cabinet and made empty 
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promises of reform, which he periodically 
repeated. 
The army remains loyal to the regime, 
although desertions and defections indicate a 
gradual erosion of support among non-Alawi 
soldiers and officers . For more than forty years 
the Syrian regime has been dominated by the 
minority ‘Alawi community, which accounts for 
about eleven percent of Syria’s population of 
21 millions, and the ‘Alawis control all senior 
positions in the army. The ‘Alawi sect is an off-
shoot of Shi’i Islam, but the sect is quite unique 
in it practices and structure. For generations, 
the ‘Alawis were poor and disadvantaged, 
but their path to influence and power was 
the military. Unlike either Tunisia or Egypt, 
where professional army officers broke with 
the president, this is unlikely to happen in 
Syria. The two most important army divisions 
are controlled by relatives of Bashar al-Asad, 
particularly his brother Maher, who has taken 
the lead in attempting to brutally crush the 
growing insurrection.
In Libya, the army was kept weak by 
design, but the standing Syrian military, with 
an active force of 400,000 is no pushover, 
even if a US-led NATO force had the appetite 
to intervene militarily, which is certainly not 
the case. The Syrian National Council has 
begun to coordinate between the loosely 
aligned admixture of secular, nationalist, 
and Islamists elements that comprise the 
opposition, but it remains unclear what a new 
Syrian government would look like. 
In November 2011, the Syrian government 
accepted an Arab League brokered initiative 
that called for dialogue and for the withdrawal 
of Syrian forces from the dissident cities; 
however, the ink was hardly dry before the 
government killing continued in Homs, while 
calling for all Syrians to turn in their weapons. 
There is no evidence that Bashar al-Asad and 
his entourage have any plan to stop short of 
vanquishing the opposition, and the likelihood 
is that the bloodletting will not only continue, but 
probably become much worse as opposition 
forces increasingly meet government bullets 
with their own. No happy ending is in sight. 
Renewed Minority Dissent in Saudi Arabia 
Significant demonstrations took place in 
Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain. In Saudi Arabia, 
the minority Shi’i Muslim community of the 
Eastern Province, who may account for ten 
percent of the country’s population, mounted 
a “Day of Rage” on March 11, which was 
also styled as “the Hanin Revolution of March 
11”. The latter is a reference to a document 
drafted by Shi’i intellectuals in 2010 that was 
presented to King ‘Abdullah. The document 
calls for respect for the civil rights of the Shi’a, 
including the end of long-term imprisonment 
without trial (citing the case of some prisoners 
who have been held for 14 years without 
trial). The police responded to the protests by 
about 800 people by arresting several dozen 
protesters, some of whom were alleged to 
have been involved in the 1996 bombing of 
the al-Khobar Tower barracks. 
The government in Riyadh was also 
concerned that restive Sunni citizens would 
be inspired to protest. By March, several 
obliging senior clerics in the holy city of Mecca 
issued a religious opinion declaring that it was 
forbidden to protest because this undermines 
security and stability. Simultaneously, King 
‘Abdullah announced a large stimulus 
package of $66.7 billion to be spent creating 
jobs, housing and medical facilities. Subjects 
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were also threatened with punishment if they 
mounted illegal demonstrations (and there is 
no possibility of “legal” demonstrations). 
In June, a group of reformist women 
renewed efforts to have the ban on women 
driving their own cars lifted. Earlier efforts 
in 1991 prompted harsh retaliation by the 
authorities, but the rejoinder a bit milder in 
2011, but the government clings to the view 
that banning women from driving “protects 
them from vice.” From the standpoint of many 
Saudi women, the ban is hugely inconvenient 
and expensive because it forces them to hire 
male drivers or depend on male members of 
the household to drive them. King Abdullah 
attempted to offer some solace in September 
2011 by promising that women would be 
permitted to vote and stand for local elections, 
but only beginning in 2015. 
The Tragedy of 
Bahrain 
In the small Gulf state 
of Bahrain many of the 
complaints coincide with 
sectarian differences 
and disparities in 
privilege that are 
extraordinary because 
they are so readily 
noticed. Although the 
Shi’i Muslims account for nearly 70 percent 
of the small population (excluding expatriate 
workers, the Bahraini citizens number 
about 600,000), they have typically been on 
the short of the stick in terms of access to 
government employment and favors. Travel 
from cosmopolitan capital of Manama to the 
predominantly and very distressed Shi›i city 
of Sitrah, and the differences are abrupt and 
stunning. Sitrah, along with many of the Shi›i 
villages in Bahrain, is a dreadful place to live. 
Unemployment and per capita income data for 
speak volumes about the inequity that defines 
Bahraini society. 
On February 14, 2011, protests 
were mounted by predominantly Shi’i 
demonstrators, although they were also joined 
by some reform-minded Sunni Muslims. Many 
of the demonstrators gathered around the 
Pearl Roundabout, a downtown Manama 
landmark where a white concrete pedestal 
held aloft a pearl, recalling earlier days when 
Bahrain was a world center for the harvesting 
of natural pearls. The demonstrators were 
overwhelmingly peaceful, and police efforts 
to dislodge them were largely unsuccessful, 
despite police violence that killed five 
protesters on February 18. The government—
urged on by the United 
States—sought a 
negotiated end to the 
protests. Crown Prince 
Salman took the lead in 
negotiations to initiate a 
serious dialogue about 
reform, particularly with 
Shaikh ‘Ali Salman, 
the soft-spoken and 
moderate head of al-
Wefaq (the Compact), 
which held all the elected opposition seats 
in parliament. Hardliners on both sides were 
skeptical of the proposed dialogue and it was 
stymied. 
On the opposition side, the rival al-Haq 
movement declared that its goal was to 
overthrow the monarchy, while within the 
regime, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman, 
The Salafists are generally 
contemptuous of profane politics, 
but have proved quite pragmatic 
in exploiting political opportunity 
in order to advance their goal of 
instilling a conservative Islamic order 
in Egypt
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the uncle of King Hamad bin Isa, and who had 
served in his post for four decades from the 
very beginning of Bahraini independence, was 
hostile to the prospect of reform. The reputedly 
corrupt prime minister, who enjoys close ties 
to Saudi Arabia, has long frustrated reformist 
efforts, not least by his grand nephew the 
Crown Prince. U.S. efforts to encourage the 
reform dialogue seemed to be bearing fruit in 
early March, but any talk of dialogue ended 
on March 14, when Saudi and UAE troops 
crossing the causeway linking the main island 
to the mainland to lead a crackdown on the 
demonstrators. The Saudi-led incursion was 
clearly a riposte to the United States, which 
King ‘Abdallah felt was much too quick to 
jump on the bandwagon of reform and far 
too reticent to support old friends (including 
President Mubarak of Egypt). Within days, 
the very symbol of the protests, the Pearl 
monument was demolished. 
All talk of reform came to a crashing halt. 
About 1,850 Shi’i employees were dismissed 
from state jobs as punishment for having 
demonstrated, and hundreds were arrested. 
Health professionals, who treated injured 
demonstrators and accused of trying to 
overthrow the regime, were tried by military 
courts and sentenced to long terms in prisons. 
Under international pressure, some of the most 
egregious military trials have been overturned 
and referred to civilian 
courts, but little has been 
done to address the 
underlying disparities 
that gave rise to the 
protests, which continue 
periodically. The risk is 
that the majority Shi’i 
population, which has 
long been surprisingly 
moderate, especially given the discrimination 
they face routinely, will be radicalized and that 
charges of foreign meddling by Iran will prove 
to be self-fulfilling. 
Conclusion 
The Arab world seems to be entering a new 
historical phase, one in which the contours 
of political power will be reshaped as more 
governments face demands for accountability 
and responsiveness to citizens’ demands. 
Never in the modern history of the Middle 
East have so many millions demanded the 
dismantling of their autocratic regimes with 
such unanimity, perseverance, and, it must be 
emphasized, courage. 
The Arab awakening plays out in 
societies where the embrace of piety 
(taqwa) is common, but the content of that 
piety is actively contested and re-imagined, 
especially among youth. Islam has become 
increasingly personalized under conditions of 
growing urbanization, globalization, and the 
commercialization of identity, not to mention 
a new horizon for political imagination. (White 
2012) Political groups cannot help but be 
influenced by what Asef Bayat calls the “quiet 
encroachment of the ordinary”, whereby 
subtle individual actions resocialize religious 
movements and governments and thereby 
create new identities 
and opportunities for 
change.(Bayat 2010) 
The dynamics of 
change underway in the 
Arab world, including 
the re-politicization of 
public space, a new 
collective autonomy, 
Never in the modern history of the 
Middle East have so many millions 
demanded the dismantling of 
their autocratic regimes with such 
unanimity, perseverance, and, it 
must be emphasized, courage
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radically changing terms of reference for 
politics, and new political imaginaries, we 
need to insure that our assessments allow 
due deference for surprise. Democracy may 
be the political solution in some cases, notably 
Tunisia, or Egypt, but that remains to be seen. 
It is not difficult to imagine other paths that 
stress stability and order at the cost of newly 
won dignity, or even in the name of that dignity. 
In his seminal article, Dankwart Rustow 
conceptualised the process of democratisation 
as a process of habituation whereby the 
players learn and grow used to democratic 
rules of the game (Rustow 1970). This is 
an important insight because it is unrealistic 
to presume that democratic systems begin 
with all parties fully imbued with democratic 
principles. Indeed, even mature democracies 
are still evolving, still democratising. 
Indigenous and exogamous factors point to 
a process of liberalisation and democratisation 
that will play out over decades. Missing until 
now have been élites committed to serious 
rather than cosmetic reform. What is not in 
doubt is that, given the opportunity, the quest 
of Middle Easterners for a better life, and for 
politics free of corruption and coercion will 
continue. 
Footnotes
(1) A. Richard Norton is professor at Boston University, 
Department of International Relations. His research 
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Imaginary in the Arab World.» Constellations 18(3). 
(3)  Ashraf el-Sherif, (2011). «Will Islamists Accept 
Political Pluralism?» Current History 110(740): 358-
363.
(4)  Omar Mukhtar was a revered leader of the anti-
colonial struggle against the Italians and he was 
hanged in 1937. 
(5)  See ‘Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405
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